Murtaugh (2014) argues, ''Since P values, confidence intervals, and DAIC are based on the same statistical information, all have their places in modern statistical practice. The choice of which to use should be stylistic . . .'' and ''To say that one of these metrics is always best ignores the complexities of ecological data analysis, as well as the mathematical relationships among the metrics. '' On the whole, I agree. I will use this Comment to discuss some technical issues and to argue that P values, confidence intervals, and change in Akaike's information criterion (DAIC) should be viewed as descriptive statistics, not as formal quantifications of evidence.
Binary declarations of significance
I agree with Murtaugh that ''One resolution of the problem of the arbitrariness of a cut-off . . . is to abandon the idea of the binary decision rule entirely and instead simply report the P value.'' However, most accept/reject declarations have no consequences, so I disagree with calling them decisions. To illustrate, after a medical trial, doctors must decide whether to prescribe a treatment and patients must decide whether to take it. But doctors' and patients' decisions need not agree with each other and need not agree with the original investigators' declaration of significance. It's not the investigators who decide; it's doctors and patients. Their decisions have consequences whose probabilities and utilities should guide the decisions.
Most accept/reject declarations have no consequences, are not guided by the probabilities and utilities of consequences, and cannot be recommended as substitutes for subsequent decisions. Though some authors explain accept/reject declarations in terms of 0-1 utility functions, those functions are chosen for explanatory value, not for realism. Where Murtaugh advises ''instead simply report the P value,'' I argue that the declaration is not a useful entity that needs something else in its stead.
That we can abandon the declaration but still report a P value, confidence interval, or DAIC shows that the arbitrariness of 0.05 is an argument against the declaration, not against the P value, CI, or DAIC. In a statistical model with p parameters where H 0 sets k of them to 0, the mathematical relationship between P values and DAIC is given by Murtaugh's Eq. 5:
For example, if k ¼ 1, then P ¼ 0.05 corresponds to DAIC ¼ 1.84 and DAIC ¼ 6 corresponds to P ¼ 0.0047. Or if k ¼ 2, then P ¼ 0.05 corresponds to DAIC ¼ 1.99 and DAIC ¼ 6 corresponds to P ¼ 0.0067.
Murtaugh adds, ''[t]he P value is a continuous measure of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis'' and presumably believes that DAIC is also a continuous measure of the strength of evidence. But both can't be precisely true, at least not in a formal sense, because, when k changes, the same P corresponds to different values of DAIC and the same DAIC corresponds to different values of P. Either the translation from P to evidence must change in different problems, or the translation of DAIC to evidence must change, or both. (Note that the P value goes backward, P goes down as the evidence against H 0 goes up, while DAIC goes forward. Murtaugh's Fig. 2 shows that P and DAIC go in opposite directions.)
Perhaps Murtaugh means that P values measure evidence informally. But when he says, ''[t]he smaller the P value, the more evidence we have against the null hypothesis,'' he suggests a monotonic relationship between P and evidence. Schervish (1996) showed that such a suggestion cannot be true. According to Schervish, ''[P-values have] often been suggested as a measure of the support that the observed data X ¼ x lend to [the hypothesis] H, or the amount of evidence in favor of H. This suggestion is always informal, and no theory is ever put forward for what properties a measure of support or evidence should have . . . . We [state] a simple logical condition . . . and show why a measure of support should satisfy this condition. We then demonstrate that P-values do not satisfy the condition.'' If Schervish is right, we cannot interpret P values as measures of support or evidence, so it is worth understanding his logic. Let H denote the parameter space. Divide H into a null and an alternative hypothesis twice-(H 0 , H a ) and (H According to Schervish, the problem is more general than just one-sided and two-sided alternatives: ''one can try to think of the P values for different values of x as the different degrees to which different data values would support a single hypothesis H. This might work as long as we do not acknowledge the possibility of other hypotheses. [But a] serious drawback to this approach is that the scale on which support is measured is not absolute, but rather depends on the hypothesis.'' By ''scale . . . depends on the hypothesis,'' he means that P ¼ 0.05 in one problem (e.g., the one-sided null) is a different amount of evidence than P ¼ 0.05 in a different problem (e.g., the point null). See Schervish (1996) for details and for how point nulls and one-sided nulls are two ends of a continuum that includes interval nulls. See Lavine and Schervish (1999) for how Bayes factors exhibit the same flaw.
A similar reversal can occur in Murtaugh's setting of nested linear models. To keep things simple, adopt the model X 1 ; Nðh 1 ; 1Þ and X 2 ; Nðh 2 ; 1Þ and the hypotheses
The model is admittedly unrealistic. Its value is that h 1 ¼ x 1 is independent ofĥ 2 ¼ x 2 ; which makes the math much easier to follow. As in Schervish, H 0 & H 0 0 ; so any evidence against H 0 0 is also evidence against H 0 . Suppose the data are x 1 ¼ 2 and x 2 ¼ 0. Then
We have P H0 . P H 0 0 ; so our P values go the same way as Schervish's and, like his, contradict his logical condition for evidence. More generally, v 2 2 stochastically dominates v 2 1 ; so the contradiction would occur for any value of x 1 as long as x 2 ' 0: An examination of more typical models in whichĥ 1 is not independent ofĥ 2 ; would require consideration of the covariance matrix of h and the resulting two-dimensional confidence ellipses and is beyond the scope of this comment.
The contradiction occurs also for DAIC. Consider a linear model with p ¼ 2 parameters and two null hypotheses H 0 : h 1 ¼ h 2 ¼ 0 and H 
, so the L and k terms work in opposite directions. The difference DAIC À DAIC 0 will be either positive or negative according to whether the difference in loglikelihoods is larger than k -k 0 . To create a Schervish-style contradiction we need only create a dataset in whichĥ 0
is negative. That will happen when the mle of the second coordinate is near 0, orĥ 2 ' 0, just as for the P value example.
We saw earlier that the translation from either P, DAIC, or both, to evidence must differ in different problems. Schervish showed that the translation from P differs in problems with point and one-sided null hypotheses. I have just shown that the translations from both P and DAIC must also differ in nested linear models. Neither P nor DAIC can be consistently interpreted as a measure of evidence without regard to the problem at hand.
What use is P and what more is there?
Murtaugh's interpretation is that ''A very small P value indicates that the data are not consistent with the null hypothesis, leading us to prefer the alternative hypothesis that the two populations have different means.'' I agree with the first half of that interpretation: a small P indicates that H 0 does not explain the data well. But I also agree with Berkson (1942) I, too, have plotted the data, in Fig. 1 . Fisher finds a small P value and rejects linearity, even though the plot shows a strong linear relationship. This might seem to be a case of statistical vs. practical significance, but Berkson continues, ''If the regression were curvilinear, a small P is to be expected relatively frequently . . . . But also a small P is to be expected relatively frequently if the regression is linear and the variability heteroscedastic . . .
[o]r if the regression is linear and . . . [temperature, the x variable] is not constant but subject to fluctuation. And there may be other conditions which, with linearity, would produce a small P relatively frequently. The small P is favorable evidence for any or several of these.'' How are we to tell which of these alternatives, or any, provide a better explanation of the data than H 0 ? The answer is, in a word, graphics. Plot data and plot residuals. Do not automatically adopt the obvious alternative hypothesis. Do not rely solely on P values or any other numerical summary. Plots can at once show nonlinearity, heteroscedasticity, and many other possible departures from H 0 . For example, Fig. 1 suggests to me the possibility that the facet numbers for temperatures 23 and 25 have been swapped. I doubt that would have occurred to me had I looked only at numerical summaries.
Plots are descriptive statistics, to be used informally. So are P values, confidence intervals, and DAIC. In fact, the P value is just a one-number summary of the familiar plot of the null-density of a test statistic along with a mark for its observed location. That plot and its P value summary are sometimes useful, as are confidence intervals and DAIC. But other plots are typically just as useful, or even more.
Summary
(1) Murtaugh and I agree on an important point: abandon accept/reject declarations. That alone will go a long way to improving statistical practice. (2) 
INTRODUCTION
The use, abuse, interpretations and reinterpretations of the notion of a P value has been a hot topic of controversy since the 1950s in statistics and several applied fields, including psychology, sociology, ecology, medicine, and economics.
The initial controversy between Fisher's significance testing and the Neyman and Pearson (N-P; 1933) hypothesis testing concerned the extent to which the pre-data Type I error probability a can address the arbitrariness and potential abuse of Fisher's post-data threshold for the P value. Fisher adopted a falsificationist stance and viewed the P value as an indicator of disagreement (inconsistency, contradiction) between data x 0 and the null hypothesis (H 0 ). Indeed, Fisher (1925:80) went as far as to claim that ''The actual value of p . . . indicates the strength of evidence against the hypothesis.'' Neyman's behavioristic interpretation of the pre-data Type I and II error probabilities precluded any evidential interpretation for the accept/reject the null (H 0 ) rules, insisting that accept (reject) H 0 does not connote the truth (falsity) of H 0 . The last exchange between these protagonists (Fisher 1955 , Pearson 1955 , Neyman 1956 ) did nothing to shed light on these issues. By the early 1960s, it was clear that neither account of frequentist testing provided an adequate answer to the question (Mayo 1996) : When do data x 0 provide evidence for or against a hypothesis H?
The primary aim of this paper is to revisit several charges, interpretations, and comparisons of the P value with other procedures as they relate to their primary aims and objectives, the nature of the questions posed to the data, and the nature of their underlying reasoning and the ensuing inferences. The idea is to shed light on some of these issues using the error-statistical perspective; see Mayo and Spanos (2011) .
FREQUENTIST TESTING AND ERROR PROBABILITIES
In an attempt to minimize technicalities but be precise about the concepts needed, the discussion will focus on the hypotheses
in the context of the simple Normal model X t ; NIID(l, r 2 ), t ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n, . . . , where NIID stands for normal, independent, and identically distributed. where St(n À 1) denotes a Student's t distribution with (n À 1) degrees of freedom, and
Fisher's significance testing ignores the alternative hypothesis in Eq. 1 and uses Eq. 2 to evaluate the P 
